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Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
8TA:TEMENT OF FAGTS
The Statement of Facts as set forth in the Plaintiffs'
Brief is substantially in accordance with Defendant's understanding and hence nothing is added thereto.
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2
STATE:MENT OF POINTS INVOLVED
Although the Plaintiffs have set forth their arguments
under four points, it appears to us that these points essentially narrow themselves down to two, to wit :
POINT NO. I.
SECTION 42.-1-81, U. C. A., 1943, IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS A PROPER EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER.
POINT NO. II.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY
OR OAPRIGIOUSLY OR IN ABUSE OF !TIS DISCRETION IN FIXING A FEE OF THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE ($375.00) DOLL,ARS.

,
~'

~

.J:

111111

ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT I.
S·EOTION 42-1-81, U. C. A., 1943, IS 'CONST1TUTIONAL AS A PROPER EXERCISE OF LEGISLAT~IVE
POWER.
Section 42-1-81, U. C. A., 1943, reads as follows:
"In all cases coming before the industrial commission in which attorneys have been employed, the
commission is vested with full power to regulate and
fix the fees of such attorneys."
Statutes similar to ours above quoted have on numerous
occasions been questioned as regards the constitutionality
thereof. In every case which we have been able to find

I'
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,

where the constitutionality of such a statute was questioned,
it has been held without exception that such statutes are
constitutional.

In the case of Buckler vs. Hilt (Ind.) 200 N. E. 219,
the Court held that the Indiana statute which provided for
the fixing of attorneys' fees by the Industrial Board of
;-- Indiana was valid and not a denial of due process of law
' nor a taking of property without just compensation, since it
falls within police power. The case further held that such
act was not unconstitutional as denying liberty of contract
and depriving the attorney of compensation for property
without due process of law, nor was it an unconstitutional
grant of special privileges or immunities by imposing restrictions upon attorneys practicing before the board differing from those imposed upon attorneys generally.
This Court in the case of Ellis vs. Industrial Commission,
91 Utah 432, 64 Pac. (2d) 363, after thorough consideration
of the matter and a review of authorities from other jurisdictions, held that the statute in question was valid and that
the Industrial Commission of Utah had the authority to fix
attorneys' fees in matters under the jurisdiction of that
commission.
The ruling in the Ellis case was bolstered and reiterated
in re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 Pac. (2d) 961.
We feel that the rulings in the two cases above cited and
previously decided by this Court are in themselves sufficient
to sustain the position that the statute is constitutional and
valid without further argument or citation of authorities.
In order, however, to call the attention of the Court to the
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uniformity of the decisions in connection with this matter
we quote from the annotation in 69 A. L. R. at Page 1319,
which reads as follows:
"Provisions of the act limiting the amounts
which attorneys may charge claimants for services
in connection with their claims, as, by requiring that
such a charge must be approved by the board or
commission to which is intrusted the administration
of the act, or by a judge, have been held constitutional whenever questioned, upon the ground that
they are a valid exercise of the police power, as well
as upon other grounds."
The annotation from which the above quotation is taken
and a subsequent annotation in 103 A. L. R., Page 906 et
seq. cite and discuss numerous cases upholding the validity
of such statutes. No case is cited therein, nor do we find
any cases where such statutes have been held unconstitutional.

Counsel for Plaintiff asserts that the act in question
contravenes Article V, 'Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah
in that it is an attempt by the legislature to permit the
executive or administrative arm of the state to interfere
with the State's judiciary. Counsel predicates this argument upon the fact that attorneys are officers of the :Court
and no one except the Courts of the state would have the
right to dictate the terms upon which counsel might act.

~~

I

·::
:1

We call attention to the case of Yeiser vs. Dysart, 267
U. S. 540, 45 Supreme Court 399, 400, 69 Lawyers Edition
775, quoted with approval in Ellis vs. Industrial Commission,
supra, as follows :
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"When we add the considerations that an attorney practises under a license from the State and
that the subject-matter is a right created by statute
it is obvious that the State may attach such conditions to the license in respect of such matters as
it believes to be necessary in order to make it a
public good."

~.

We submit further that, in appearing before the Industrial Commission, which is a quasi judicial body of the
State of Utah, that attorneys are officers of the commission
and by so appearing subject themselves to the rules and
regulations of the commission, and particularly such rules
and regulations as have been provided by statute.
In view of the foregoing we submit that the statute
in question is constitutional and that the commission acted
within its jurisdiction in fixing the attorneys' fees in this
matter.
ARGUMENT II.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY
OR CAPRICIOUSLY OR IN ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION IN F'IXING A FEE OF THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FIVE ($375.00) DOLLARS.
We find it difficult as attorneys, to argue that the fee
allowed by the Industrial Commission in this matter was
adequate and in line with the services rendered by the
Plaintiffs. If the pre~ailing opinion in the Ellis case means
that the commission can determine the fee merely upon the
record in the case and without any independent evidence
on the question of the value of the attorneys' services, even
where request is made to permit the production of such
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evidence, then probably it can be said that the commission
had before it sufficient information upon which to act and
that there is nothing before this Court from which it could
be said that the commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
On the other hand, it appears clear that no hearing
was had or given to the Plaintiffs on the specific question
as to the reasonableness of the fee which should be awarded
for the services rendered. There are authorities to the '
effect that a proper and constitutional administration of a j
statute such as ours require the opportunity for a hearinJJ
on the question as to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees,
particularly where such a hearing is requested. See Shilling
vs. Industrial Accident Commission (Cal.) 190 Pac. 3'73.'
See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in the Ellis case.
Under all of the circumstances and in the light of the :
authorities and good reason, we are inclined to feel that the
better rule would require the commission to grant to the
attorneys an opportunity to be heard on the question of
reasonableness of fees in compensation cases. In this respect,
in order to be honest with this Court in the presentation of
our views to it, we must confess that in our opinion the Industrial Commission abused its authority and discretion in
fixing the fees in this case without permitting the Plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence with regard thereto.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER, A. GILES,
Attorney General,
ZAR E. HAYES,
Assistant Attorney General.
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